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Of Snakes and Butterflies: A Reply 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
Abstract 
 
This brief essay, a reply to a forthcoming essay by Radicals in Robes by 
Saikrishna Prakash in the Columbia Law Review, makes two points. The first is that the 
abstract idea of interpretation cannot support originalism or indeed any judgment about 
the competing (reasonable) approaches to the Constitution. Any such judgment must be 
defended on pragmatic grounds, which means that it must be attentive to consequences. 
The second point is that the consequentialist judgments that support minimalism also 
suggest that there are times and places in which minimalism is rightly abandoned. For 
example, broad rulings may well be justified when predictability calls for it; and the 
Supreme Court was right to refuse minimalism in the late 1930s. While minimalism is 
generally the proper approach to “frontiers” issue in constitutional law, its own 
pragmatic foundations suggest that constitutional law should not be insistently or 
dogmatically minimalist. 
 
I. Audiences 
 
 Such trouble over the title! The original proposal was called The War for the 
Constitution – but the debate about constitutional interpretation just isn’t a war. At one 
point, I favored Visions of the Constitution, but my publisher vetoed that idea – too 
boring. The final draft was called Fundamentally Wrong. Vigorous, to be sure, but also 
obscure, and offering, without charge, a snappy two-word ending for unkind reviewers. 
At the last moment, my publisher proposed Radicals in Robes: Why Right-Wing Courts 
Are Wrong for America. I accepted the proposal on the ground that with respect to titles, 
publishers tend to know best. But I did insist that the word “extreme” be added before 
“right-wing” – with the thought that while right-wing courts might not be so bad, extreme 
right-wing courts are definitely wrong for America. On reflection, the addition probably 
didn’t help. Oh well. 
 
 Radicals in Robes was written for a general audience, and its original motivation 
was simple: To challenge the ludicrous but apparently widespread view that while 
liberals want to “change” the Constitution, conservatives want to “follow” it. In the last 
decade and more, some conservative judges have been reading the Constitution in a way 
that lines up with their own political views: to invalidate affirmative action programs, 
campaign finance laws, and restrictions on gun control; to strike down certain laws 
protecting the environment and forbidding discrimination on the basis of disability and 
age; to protect commercial advertising; to permit discrimination on the basis of sex and 
sexual orientation; to allow government to provide financial and other assistance to 
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religious institutions; to give the President broad, unilateral authority to fight to war on 
terror; and to contain no right of reproductive choice or sexual liberty. Radicals in Robes 
was partly designed to show that for all the talk of “strict construction,” and for all the 
insistence on distinguishing between law and politics, we are in the midst of a period in 
which some prominent conservatives1 are attempting to use judicial power for their own 
political ends. Of course judges usually act in good faith. But it is nonetheless true that 
references to history, and to the views of the framers and ratifiers, are sometimes a fraud 
and a façade. 
 
At the same time, Radicals in Robes tries to make two points that (the author 
hoped) might have academic interest as well. The first is that throughout American 
history, many of our debates about constitutional interpretation have involved conflicts 
among four identifiable groups: originalists,2 perfectionists,3 minimalists, and 
majoritarians.4 The second is that any approach to constitutional interpretation has to be 
defended by reference to its consequences.5 The Constitution does not set out the 
                                                 
1 It is not entirely comfortable, in a law review article or in a book about constitutional law, to make 
references to “conservatives” and “liberals,” or to use words like “right-wing” and “left-wing.” One reason 
is that terms of this kind threaten to stop thought for conservatives and liberals alike. (People sometimes 
ask, not what they think on particular questions, but what their group thinks about those questions – and in 
particular what the opposing group thinks on such questions. The views of the groups, once identified, can 
crowd out and close off their own thought.) Another reason is that the views of sensible people cannot 
possibly line up consistently with the stereotypical judgments of either “conservatives” or “liberals” or “the 
right” or “the left.” Why on earth should anyone follow the stereotypes with respect such diverse questions 
as affirmative action, Roe v. Wade, same-sex marriage, the minimum wage, the Iraq War, capital 
punishment, and climate change – to name a very small subset of salient questions in law and politics?  
 Nonetheless, Radicals in Robes does use politically charged language, and not only in its title. The 
reason is that the Supreme Court, and methods of constitutional interpretation, have been politicized by 
conservatives and liberals alike, and it is hard to write a book for a general audience without discussing 
some of the underlying political views and dynamics. Prakash says that I am “not trying to convince the 
right,” but in fact I meant to speak to people with widely varying political views; I do not believe that 
reflective “conservatives” should endorse originalism, just as I do not believe that reflective “liberals” 
should endorse perfectionism. 
2 In Radicals in Robes, I use the term “fundamentalism” for “originalism,” on the ground that the 
former term seems to me at once more accessible and illuminating for a general audience; originalists want 
to go back to what they see as fundamentals, and in any case there is a clear link between the originalist 
method and certain claims about how to interpret religious texts. I did not intend “fundamentalism” to be a 
pejorative in any way. But some originalists, including Prakash, object to that term, and in deference to 
their objection I am happy to speak of “originalism” instead.  
3 For an illuminating recent defense (with a good title!), see Ronald Dworkin, Justice In Robes (2006).  
4 For a valuable recent defense, see Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (2006). 
5 This claim can also be found in Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty (2005) and Vermeule, supra note; and 
I believe that with some qualification, it is implicit in Dworkin, supra note. There are interesting 
relationships between Dworkin’s conception of law as integrity – which I characterize as a form of 
perfection – and minimalism. In my view, any conception of constitutional interpretation must, in the end, 
be perfectionist, in the sense that it attempts to make best sense out of our practices. Originalists, 
minimalists, and majoritarians can be understood as perfectionists too – but second-order ones, skeptical 
about the idea that judges should deploy moral and political ideals of their own. Originalists, for example, 
seek to deprive judges of the authority to deploy those ideals, often on the ground that judicial judgments 
are unreliable and in any event a disservive to self-government. Majoritarians are similarly skeptical of the 
view that judges have some special access to moral and political truth. See Vermeule, supra note. But a 
serious problem, for both originalists and majoritarians, is that their approaches are inconsistent with so 
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instructions for its own interpretation. A theory of interpretation has to be defended, 
rather than asserted, and the defense must speak candidly in terms of the system of 
constitutional law that it will yield. Consider the illuminating suggestion by Randy 
Barnett, a committed originalist: “Given a sufficiently good constitutional text, 
originalists maintain that better results will be reached overall if government officials—
including judges—must stick to the original meaning rather than empowering them to 
trump that meaning with one that they prefer.”6 In my view, Barnett is entirely right to 
suggest that if originalism is to be defended, it is on the ground that it will produce 
“better results . . . overall.” 
 
Of course consequences can be evaluated in different ways, and hence we should 
expect diverse people to disagree about which consequences are good. If originalism 
permits racial segregation, is it unacceptable for that reason? How strongly, if at all, does 
it account against originalism if originalists must allow affirmative action programs, or 
refuse to recognize a right of privacy? And in evaluating consequences, we must certainly 
ask whether an approach to interpretation would unleash judges to do whatever they 
wish. To say the least, self-government is important, and part of the appeal of 
majoritarianism, originalism, and minimalism is that all three approaches attempt to cabin 
the power and the discretion of the Supreme Court. Perfectionism has a serious problem 
on this count; and hence minimalists have a serious problem with (for example) the 
reasoning in Roe v. Wade. 
 
I am grateful to Saikrishna Prakash for his illuminating, careful, and generous 
review. Prakash makes two principal arguments. The first and more straightforward is 
that originalism “is merely a means of making sense of text,” and hence originalists need 
not provide, and do not provide, any argument on its behalf. The second and more 
complex is that minimalism is not a theory of interpretation at all, but a kind of “passing 
fancy” -- an approach that its own advocates will surely abandon when the time is right, 
just “like a snake sheds its skin.” For this reason, minimalism turns out to be unstable, 
even opportunistic. Let me begin with Prakash’s claims on behalf of originalism.  
 
II. A Theory of Interpretation Must Be Defended, Not Asserted 
 
Prakash insists that in deciding on the meaning of a text, we should not think 
about consequences at all. He acknowledges that we might refuse to accept a text, after 
we have uncovered its true meaning. But there is a large difference between picking 
policies (for, say, environmental protection) and deciding on how to understand the 
Constitution’s terms. Originalists believe “that to discern the meaning of words, we ask 
what it would mean to those who penned or uttered those words.” Prakash offers what he 
calls a “simple case” for the originalist approach, which is that “it tracks common 
                                                                                                                                                 
much of established law – and hence do not “fit” our practices. Minimalists, who also attempt to discipline 
judicial power, can make better claims along the dimension of fit. The relationship between integrity and 
consequentialism is this: In deciding what makes best sense out of the existing legal materials, 
consequentialists insist that consequences matter. As noted in text, a normative account is of course needed 
to evaluate consequences.  
6 Available at http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_cie0505.msp. 
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conceptions.” Originalism is not a political choice, any more than it is a political choice 
to be originalist when reading law reviews articles or People Magazine. When we ask 
about the meaning of words uttered by friends and acquaintances, we are likely to be 
originalists; we ask what they meant. Why isn’t the same true for constitutional law? 
 
Prakash means to ask a rhetorical question. But (a rhetorical question) has he? Let 
put to one side two problems that originalists must overcome: (a) the possibility that the 
framers and ratifiers meant to offer a general principle whose meaning is not frozen over 
time; and (b) the difficulties in construing the constitutional text in circumstances that the 
framers and ratifiers could not possibly anticipate.7 Even if we disregard these two 
problems, debates over constitutional interpretation cannot possibly be resolved by 
stipulating what interpretation “is,” or by pointing to “common conceptions.” What is 
needed is an argument, not a stipulation. And if “common conceptions” are to be 
followed, it is because good reasons can be marshaled on their behalf. To marshal good 
reasons, we will have to speak of consequences. 
 
In fact judgments about interpretation are always consequentialist; pragmatic8 
arguments, of one or another sort, cannot be avoided. Suppose that a friend says, “let’s 
meet in the usual place for lunch today.” Of course I would ask about the specific, 
intended meaning – not about the most popular (“usual”) place in the area, and not about 
my own judgments about what place is, or ought to be, usual. But the reason for this kind 
of everyday originalism is not adequately captured by a stipulation about what meaning 
“is”; the reason lies in the point, or reason, or purpose, of this particular communication. 
When my friend and I are deciding where to meet for lunch, it makes no sense for me to 
do anything other than to attempt to discern his specific, intended meaning. (If I don’t do 
that, we won’t meet!) In contexts in which we ask about specific, intended meanings, and 
do that without much thinking, it is because consequentialist or pragmatic arguments so 
require. But sometimes an inquiry into authorial intentions cannot be justified in this way. 
 
Consider one of Prakash’s own examples: judicial interpretation of the precedents 
of the Supreme Court. Prakash thinks that I “surely envision[] that originalism would be 
used.” But I envision no such thing, and in fact the example cuts hard against his claim 
about “common conceptions.” No one follows originalism in interpreting the Court’s own 
precedents. No one thinks that the Court must ask, in interpreting (say) Roe v. Wade or 
Brown v. Bd. Of Educ. or McCulloch v. Maryland: What was the specific, original 
                                                 
7 See Radicals in Robes, supra note, at XX-YY. Throughout this Reply, I assume that originalism is a 
coherent enterprise that can overcome these objections. 
8 I am understanding pragmatic arguments to be consequentialist ones, as in the standard pragmatic 
view. See Williams James, What Pragmatism Means, in Pragmatisn 43, 45 (1907): “The pragmatic method 
is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable. Is the world 
one or many? – fated or free? – material or spiritual? – here are notions either of which may or may not 
hold good of the world; and disputes over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases 
is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it 
practically make to any one if this notion rather than that notion were true?” I believe that Prakash’s 
argument is pre-pragmatic, in the sense that it refuses to trace the “respective practical consequences” of 
one or another view of interpretation, and acts as if hard questions can be solved at the level of concepts or 
definitions. But an effort to establish this point would take me beyond the boundaries of this Reply. 
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meaning intended by Justice Blackmun or Chief Justice Warren or Chief Justice Marshall, 
or by those who signed the Court’s opinion? When the Court interprets its own 
precedents, it is hardly originalist; it attempts to make best sense out of the prior 
decisions, in a way that has nothing to do with specific authorial intentions. 
 
Of course a theory of interpretation, to qualify as such, must attend to the text that 
is being construed; otherwise it is not a theory of interpretation at all. But constitutional 
interpretation is, or at least might be, very different from communication between friends 
– in the sense that specific, intended meanings are, or might be, controlling in the latter 
context but not in the former. The (inescapable) question is whether consequentialist 
arguments justify our adoption of a theory of interpretation that requires adherence to the 
original understanding of the founding document. That question must be answered with 
an argument, not a stipulation. The idea of authorial intentions is attractive in many 
contexts, but it is not compelled by the very idea of interpretation, and indeed many 
prominent originalists recognize the point9 – and reject authorial intentions in favor of the 
original public meaning.10 
 
There is no a priori reason to reject originalism.11 We could easily imagine a 
society in which originalism would have a strong consequentialist defense. In such a 
society, the original understanding would lead to an excellent system of rights and 
institutions; departures from the original understanding would untether judges, who 
would compromise democratic self-government and produce an inferior system or rights 
and institutions; and the original understanding, if followed, would permit the democratic 
process to correct inadequate understandings of rights and institutions over time. In such 
a society, what could possibly be wrong with originalism? Many originalists believe that 
our own society is not unrecognizably different from this one.12 If they are right, 
originalism might be justifiable on consequential grounds. But I do not think that they are 
right. Originalism fails for that reason. The broader point is that originalism is 
inescapably a political choice, and it has to be evaluated as such. 
 
Prakash does not care about the consequences of originalism, so apparently it 
does not matter to him, for purposes of selecting an approach to constitutional 
interpretation, if originalism, properly understood, would permit race and sex 
discrimination by the national government; eliminate the right to privacy; allow racial 
segregation at the state level; permit states to establish their own religions; require 
abolition of the administrative state; or for that matter doom most Americans to short and 
miserable lives. Nonetheless, Prakash does think it relevant to say that I ascribe “unlikely 
                                                 
9 See Barnett, supra note. 
10 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1997). 
11 I am bracketing some historical and conceptual questions. See note supra. 
12 See Akhil Amar, Rethinking Originalism, Slate (2005), available at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2126680/ Of course Amar does not contend that the Constitution, as originally 
understood, is perfect, but he attempts to rebut the consequentialist argument against originalism. If Amar 
were correct on the consequences of originalism, the argument against originalism would be significantly 
weakened. Interestingly, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1997), and Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U Cin L Rev 849 (1989) have strong consequentialist features; Scalia 
does not contend that originalism is right because it is what interpretation is.  
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possibilities” to originalism and that my account of its consequences is “silly.” His reason 
is that the consequences that I trace “simply would not transpire if this country followed 
the original Constitution.” For example, there “is no groundswell for racial segregation,” 
and “there is no likelihood that the states will reestablish churches.” 
 
Prakash is right to say that if originalism were followed, states are unlikely to 
respond by segregating schools by race or by establishing their own churches. But 
Prakash understates the contemporary importance of the constitutional doctrines that are 
now in place. Without the current ban on racial discrimination, we would surely see much 
more in the way of racial discrimination. Without the current application of the 
Establishment Clause to the states, we would surely see, at some times and places, forms 
of government favoritism toward religion, and forms of religious struggle in state 
legislatures, that would make the United States a quite different nation from what it now 
is. In any case my goal is to trace the potential consequences of originalism for 
constitutional law, a point of independent interest; and on that point Prakash offers no 
rejoinder at all. 
  
III. What Minimalism Isn’t 
 
Prakash has a great deal to say about minimalism. He objects that small steps can 
go in many different directions, and that minimalism, in the abstract, does not identify the 
proper directions. He contends that far from being a theory of interpretation, minimalism 
is merely an account of how courts should decide cases, one that “tends to privilege the 
views of the Warren and Burger courts” and thus defends “the doctrinal status quo.” Most 
fundamentally, he objects that if consequentialism is really our guide, the appeal of 
minimalism is sharply limited. As Prakash contends, “perhaps consequential[ist] 
minimalists really ought to be perfectionist about legislative power, originalists about 
executive power, and majoritarians when it comes to privacy rights.” He argues that if 
originalists succeed n the next twenty years, and make radical changes in the law, 
“minimalism has got to go” – hoist by its own consequentialist petard. A consequentialist 
minimalist turns out to be fickle, because he would have to abandon his own method after 
a long period of originalism or majoritarianism. In any case Prakash thinks that 
minimalism is less humble than it appears to be. In the end it depends on a belief that “the 
doctrinal status quo is rather good” – a freestanding judgment that seems evaluative and 
so not terribly modest. 
 
I think that Prakash is generally right here, and that the conscientious minimalist 
ought to welcome most of these claims. Prakash is right to say that minimalism does not 
specify the small steps that judges ought to take. It is possible to imagine liberal 
minimalists and conservative minimalists; majoritarian minimalists and originalist 
minimalists; “active liberty” minimalists13 and “negative liberty” minimalists. Prakash is 
also right to press hard on the relationship between consequentialism and minimalism. 
With good reason, he argues that consequentialism supplies the best defense of 
minimalism – and that when consequentialism argues against minimalism, we ought not 
to be minimalists. 
                                                 
13 This is a plausible characterization of Justice Breyer. See Breyer, supra note. 
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It is important to disaggregate two aspects of minimalism here. First, minimalists 
tend to like decisions that are narrow, in the sense that they do not want to cover issues 
not before the Court. Minimalists also prefer decisions that are shallow, in the sense that 
they avoid the largest theoretical controversies and can attract support from those with 
diverse perspectives on the most contentious questions. But sensible minimalists offer no 
theology or dogma. They freely admit that when predictability is important, narrowness 
can be a big mistake.14 They agree that if the Court has enough experience to justify 
acceptance of a deep theory, it is entitled to do exactly that. No sensible person could 
embrace minimalism in all times and places, and hence Prakash’s objections to 
minimalism, in some times and places, is entirely within the spirit of the most plausible 
claims on its behalf, which are pragmatic and qualified. 
 
This point should not be read for more than it is worth; Prakash reads the 
argument for minimalism as more limited and less ambitious than it actually is. That 
argument is hardly restricted to the particular circumstances of the early twentieth 
century. Minimalism is grounded in an appreciation of the common law method and its 
appropriate place in constitutional law. In the hardest and most controversial cases, the 
Supreme Court should generally follow minimalism.15 For this reason, there is good 
reason to doubt the analysis in Roe v. Wade, Reynolds v. Simms, and indeed a number of 
the ambitious decisions of the Warren Court. Minimalists are skeptical of broad rulings 
and theoretical ambition, whatever the political commitments that accompany them. On 
consequentialist grounds, the frontiers cases in constitutional law – whatever their time 
and place – are strong candidates for minimalism. 
 
But let us sharpen Prakash’s challenge and suppose that in the next decades, the 
least attractive and most highly politicized form of originalism prevails, so that the Court 
moves the Constitution in directions that closely correspond to the views of the extreme 
wing of the Republican Party. (Of course such a movement is exceedingly unlikely; it’s a 
thought experiment, not a prediction.) After the movement is complete, should we want 
new appointees to be minimalists – and merely to take small steps within the new 
framework that the Court has devised? In my view, this question is close to that faced by 
the Court in the late 1930s, when it had to choose among three possible courses for 
dealing with the doctrine that it had developed in the last decades: to build on it, in 
minimalist fashion; to chip away at it, also in minimalist fashion; or to repudiate it fairly 
rapidly. The Court chose the third path. Was it wrong to do so? I do not think so, 
especially because the decisions of the Lochner era erected a range of barriers -- with 
dubious constitutional roots on any sensible interpretive theory -- to the decisions of 
democratically elected officials, both state and federal.16  
 
Of course any approach to interpretation, to qualify as such, must attempt to limit 
judges; its application should not vary between Monday and Tuesday. But an approach 
that makes sense in one nation may be senseless in another, and it is fine for courts to 
                                                 
14 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Minimalism, 58 Stan L Rev 1899 (2006). 
15 On the exceptions, see id; Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time (1999). 
16 For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, Mich L Rev (forthcoming). 
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follow one approach in 1800 and quite another in 1954. If Prakash’s objection to the 
contingency of minimalism seems convincing, consider the fact that no one complains 
when courts rule narrowly because they lack enough information to rule ambitiously.17 
Nor is it unusual to think that when a precedent is wrong, it should be limited rather than 
extended – and that when it is egregiously wrong, it must be overruled.  
 
It is true that minimalists must, on some occasions, be prepared to leave their 
cocoons. But if an approach to constitutional law must be justified by reference to its 
consequences, this is no problem for minimalism. Snakes shed their skins,18 but so, in 
their way, do butterflies. 
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Professor Cass Sunstein 
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17 See Breyer, Active Liberty, supra note (discussing privacy). 
18 See Prakash, supra, at  
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